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ABSTRACT

Current trends in armaments and militarism in the third world countries must be assessed against a background of imperialism and in relation to the tendency to use nuclear power for peaceful ends and oil power for militaristic ends. Discussion of these factors with relation to China, India, and the Arab countries requires examination of militaristic attitudes and the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Arab world's discovery of oil power and subsequent formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are also discussed. It appears that interconnections among different sectors of policy exist along with interdependence among nations. The pursuit of disarmament or arms control cannot be separated from the struggle for equity in world politics. Since the power of the oil-producing nations is contributing toward a new world order, a new international military order becomes one precondition for a new international economic order. China's experimental rockets, India's nuclear devices, and the Arab consortium's arms industry may have to be placed alongside of OPEC as part of their total leverage if there is to be a change toward greater equity between developing and developed nations. Because nuclear capacity is linked with the third world's quest for dignity and power, some degree of proliferation may be the price for equality. (Author/KC)

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The Barrel of the Gun and the Barrel of Oil in North-South Equation

ALI A. MAZRUI

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This paper is one in a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue, and political action which will contribute to a movement for a just world order. The papers will deal with major global problems facing humanity, and particularly vexing contemporary political, economic, social, and cultural issues within an analytic and normative framework guided by the concepts and values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological stability. Special emphasis will be given to the necessity and feasibility of structural transformation of today's fragmented world in order to resolve these problems and achieve just world order results.

A Working Group of the World Order Models Project (WOMP) will use these papers in its new program aimed at publishing a statement in 1980 outlining the strategies for realizing just world order during this century. We invite interested individuals throughout the globe to respond to the various papers either directly to the individual authors or to WOMP. These communications will figure significantly in the WOMP Working Group's final statement. Where appropriate, the responses and critiques will be published in *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*.

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THE BARREL OF THE GUN AND THE BARREL OF OIL IN NORTH–SOUTH EQUATION*

Ali A. MAZRUI†

The paper discusses the role of the newly discovered petropower and of the striving for nuclear status in the Third World politics, both between the various countries that comprise it and between the Third World as a whole and the West. The first has to do with the competition for leverage and influence determined mainly by ideology, economics (which, in the last analysis, means technology), and military power. The second has to do with the striving for dignity and equity. This politics is vastly complicated by the industrialized and nuclearized Western powers' intervention in pursuit of the dual goal of pacifying one form of energy, nuclear, to perpetuate its dominance through the monopoly of the atom, and militarizing another form of energy, oil, to be able to get it cheap, if possible, and in abundance.

Introduction

One cannot understand the nature of the obstacles to arms control in the Third World without first understanding the social forces which are favoring armament and militarism in those regions. Sometimes the arms race in the Third World is due more to issues of status and social justice than to considerations of security and defense. On the one side, Third World countries are in competition with each other for leverage and influence, and, on the other, they feel uneasy about their relations with the industrial states. Because of these factors, arms control as an issue cannot be treated in relation only to peace; it has to be examined in relation also to social justice and human dignity.

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*To be published in Japanese translation as part of a book on nuclear disarmament by the Japanese Committee of Pugwash.

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In human history so far, dignity has been more often served by bearing arms rather than by renouncing them. For many societies, there was something rather effeminate or infantile in being 'defenseless'. Manliness postulated a capacity to defend oneself physically. On this point, the Constitution of the United States and the tribal ways of the Kikuyu people of Kenya are wholly in accord. The Second Amendment of the American constitution guaranteed 'the right of the people to keep and bear arms'. And Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya tells us of the paramount resolution of young Kikuyu boys on being initiated in accordance with ancient custom: 'We brandish our spear, which is the symbol of our courageous and fighting spirit, never to retreat or abandon our hope, or run away from our comrades.'

But then came imperial rule to Africa and elsewhere in the Third World – and with it came concepts like Pax Britannica. V.I. Lenin was later to argue that imperialism was 'the monopoly stage of capitalism'. Perhaps more defensible as a thesis at that time was the argument that imperialism was the monopoly stage of warfare. Implicit in the concept of Pax Britannica was the belief that the white races had a duty to disarm the rest of mankind. In every colony the imperial doctrine of monopoly of warfare merged with a more familiar doctrine in political analysis: that in a political community only the rulers have a right to use violence in dealing with citizens. Indeed, political analysts since Max Weber have sometimes defined the State in terms of its monopoly of the use of physical force within a given territory. A variant formulation of this same idea in the West is the ethic that no citizen should 'take the law into his own hands'. This, again, is an assertion of the state monopoly in certain forms of coercion.

When the colonial power became, to all intents and purposes, 'the State' in many parts of Asia and Africa, a doctrinal merger took place between this principle of state monopoly in physical coercion and the imperial claim of monopoly of warfare. In the total ideology of Western imperialism, the right to initiate violence became a prerogative which only civilization and statehood could bestow.

It is partly against this imperial background that we must assess the significance of current trends in armaments and militarism in the Third World.

Shadow of imperialism

A new and potentially momentous dialectic has now entered the stage of world history. The thesis of the dialectic is the struggle to pacify nuclear energy; the antithesis is the trend toward militarizing oil power; the

synthesis is yet to reveal itself. At the center of this drama are three Afro–Asian peoples–the Chinese, the Indians, and the Arabs. The pacification of nuclear energy requires the kind of safeguards that would make it possible to exploit nuclear power for a wide range of peaceful uses without incurring serious risks of radioactive pollution or other negative effects. But such pacification also requires the kind of world in which those countries that acquire peaceful nuclear know–how are not tempted to convert it into military capability. Both China and India found the temptation to acquire military nuclear capability too strong to resist. Nuclear proliferation in this military sense therefore made the quest for the pacification of nuclear energy urgent.

A sense of immediacy was added to it in 1973 when the world seemed to be on the verge of an energy crisis. In the general field of energy, petroleum and nuclear power were already widely regarded as potentially competitive alternatives. But ever since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) asserted its power and quadrupled the price of oil, the idea of experimenting with new forms of energy acquired additional salience. Partly under Henry Kissinger's influence while he was still America's Secretary of State, the major industrial countries of the West have paid at least lip service to the policy of finding alternatives to oil. Among these potential alternatives, nuclear energy has often been regarded as particularly promising, in spite of all its hazards.

As for the militarization of oil power, this is manifesting itself in the disproportionate utilization of oil revenues by Middle Eastern producers for armaments and military technology. According to American sources, military purchases by Saudi Arabia in the next five years will be $2·5 billion to $3 billion, mostly from American defense contractors. An official of Frost and Sullivan Inc., a New York–based international market–analysis firm, stated that the military imports of the Saudis in 1975 amounted to about $4·5 billion.

Iran, on its part, has spent since 1972 more than $15 billion on military equipment ranging from sophisticated aircraft to tanks. Says Pace (1977):

> Attention has been focused on Iran's air force because that is where the bulk of the new sophisticated equipment has been going–and will continue to go. In August [1976], it was announced that the United States has agreed to sell Iran 160 F–16's at a cost of well over $3 billion. Iran has also expressed interest in buying 140 more of the F–16's.... What Iran had earlier received or ordered from the United States includes, at rough count, a half dozen Lockheed P–3 sea reconnaissance aircraft; 80 Grumman F–14 Tomcat fighters; more than 300 McDonnell Douglas F–4 fighter–bombers and Northrop F–5 fighters; two dozen Boeing 747 and 707 military tanker and cargo aircraft; 500 Bell military helicopters; and four Spruance–class advanced destroyers, which are to be delivered to Iran in the 1980's.

For these two Muslim countries, surplus petrodollars ended the era of begging for alms–and inaugurated the age of '*Arms* for the Love of Allah'!

Certainly, for Saudi Arabia, if not for Iran, piety and power have become inextricably intertwined.

Behind both the militarization of oil power and the domestication of nuclear energy lies the shadow of imperialism in world politics. The Western powers, since the rise of OPEC, would like the Third World to produce as much oil as possible. These same Western powers, especially since India's explosion of a nuclear device with the inadvertent aid of Canada, would prefer that the Third World should develop as little nuclear energy as possible. Western preference for abundant oil seeks at once to maximize Western flexibility and to bring the price of oil down. Western preference for minimal nuclear capacity in the Third World seeks to arrest nuclear proliferation, both for sensible reasons, connected with human survival, and for selfish reasons, related to nuclear monopoly by the big powers. This imperialist dilemma (maximum oil producers but minimal nuclear powers in the Third World) has contradictory implications for the other dialectic of energy we mentioned earlier: pacifying nuclear energy and militarizing oil power. In a bid to curry favor with the influential Third World countries, including the oil producers, the West is helping some of them to develop a capacity for peacefully utilizing nuclear energy. But since these countries also have military aspirations, the spread of nuclear energy is not always peaceful in its consequences. Pacified nuclear energy can indeed be re-militarized.

We have so far discussed the dialectic of energy in relation to the dialectic of imperialism. The third dialectic concerns leadership within the Third World itself.

Third World politics

The four most important qualifications for leadership in the Third World are size, ideology, economics, and military prowess. India under Nehru was for a while the most important ideological leader in the Third World. China under Mao Tse-tung was doubtless ideologically influential among Third World *intellectuals*, but far less so among Third World politicians and policy-makers. China's status in the Third World was only confirmed when she emerged as a potential superpower, complete with nuclear capacity. On the whole, then, China's credentials for leadership have included both ideological and military components as well as the sheer size of the country.

As for the Arabs, their rise to new power in the last quarter of the twentieth century has, of course, been derived from primarily economic factors, with

special reference to oil. The most influential Arab country until 1970 was Egypt. Her credentials were based partly on relative size (the largest of the Arab countries) and partly on ideology (under Nasser's brand of Pan-Arabism and Third World solidarity). Since Nasser's death, influence has shifted from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is small in population, militarily underdeveloped, ideologically anachronistic, but economically powerful because of her immense petroleum resources. A major ambition of the Saudis is to acquire military credentials for leadership in addition to their economic leverage.

Let us now look more closely at China, India and the Arabs in relation to the wider politics of the Third World.

China: from guerrilla warfare to nuclear status

In the military field, Mao Tse-tung's relevance for the Third World ranges from theories of guerrilla warfare to policies of nuclear defense. Mao's contribution to guerrilla warfare is summed up by Grundy (1971):

> It is generally assumed that Mao Tse-tung contributed more to a general theory of guerrilla warfare than any single individual and that the impact of his thought upon guerrillas and counter-guerrillas is widespread. By and large this is a correct appraisal....
>
> Mao Tse-tung, by refining and systematizing thinking about guerrilla warfare, made guerrilla warfare both militarily and politically comprehensible and set it in the context of class struggle.... to Mao war (like revolution) must follow a 'scientifically ascertainable' course. Mao's skill was in his ability to pull together into a single operational theory disparate body of ideas and data previously available and to abstract a set of principles with broader application than many at first realized.

When we refer to the Chinese model in relation to Africa, we are referring both to this theory and strategy of liberation and to the Chinese example in economic and technological development. The latter includes China's success in establishing the basis of a nuclear deterrent. Mao Tse-tung contributed less than Lenin to theories of imperialism but much more than Lenin to strategies of liberation, including the tactics of armed resistance and guerrilla struggle. Two fundamental modifications to Marxism, which Maoism seems to emphasize, are, firstly, belief in the peasantry and, secondly, belief in the gun. Let us take each of these in that order.

Reliance on the peasantry. Part of the core of Maoism is certainly a reliance on the peasantry as the vanguard of the revolution. This is a significant modification and departure from European Marxism with its emphasis on the proletariat. As early as 1927, in his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, Mao (1967) affirms the leading role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution:

The present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists, war-lords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their graves. Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead them. To trail behind them gesticulating and criticising. Or to stand in their way and oppose them. Every Chinese is free to choose, but events will force you to make the choice quickly.

Belief in the gun. Mao Tse-tung, perhaps unlike early European Marxists, had a profound belief also in the gun. What the socialist revolution needed was not just industrial action and a self-conscious proletariat. It also needed the power which tends to reside in the gun. In the words of Mao (1963), 'Having guns, we can create Party organization.... We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movement. Everything in Yenan has been created by having guns.'

Mao (1954) saw the army not just as an instrument of war, but also as an instrument of revolutionary mobilization:

When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organize them, to arm them, and to help establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.

Mao worked out ideas concerning when to advance in a guerrilla struggle and when to retreat; when to avoid the enemy and when to harass the enemy; when to go into hiding and when to start the chase: 'The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy holds, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.'

Mao was sensitive to the difference between a situation where the oppressed classes are fighting their own domestic masters and a situation where all nationals are fighting an alien conqueror. China itself experienced both forms of struggle. The Chinese fought their own privileged classes, and organized to resist Japanese occupation; they fought to redistribute land in their own society as well as to thwart the machinations of western powers in China. This ran counter to the older Marxist assumption that colonized peoples are most likely to attain their freedom when the proletariat in the imperialist metropolitan rises in revolt against its own internal oppressors. In Africa, the evidence of armed liberation has been more in support of the Maoist than of the classical Marxist position.

The transmission of Maoist ideas was sometimes indirect. Maoism did influence Vietnamese, Cubans, and other Third World radical fighters. Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara both show Maoist influence in their liberation strategy. An armchair revolutionary guerrilla fighter was Kwame Nkrumah, who, however, began writing about revolutionary warfare only after he had

been overthrown in a military coup in 1966 (ironically, while he was Mao's guest in Peking). His thoughts on revolutionary warfare (Nkrumah, 1968) may have had some influence on African intellectuals but precious little on African guerrilla fighters as such. It cannot be denied that wherever guerrilla war is either discussed or waged, the Chinese example is at least remembered and at times used as an inspiration. On this issue, Mao has certainly overshadowed not only Lenin but also to some extent Marx.

But China's military significance for Third World aspirations extends beyond the sten gun and bush warfare. China's entry into the nuclear club in 1965 created almost as much excitement in Africa and the rest of Asia as did Japan's victory over Russia in 1905. The Japanese victory in the first decade of the century was seen by many Afro–Asian nationalists as the most significant victory by a nonwhite country against a European state in modern history. But there were setbacks, including two world wars and Japan's own nuclear humiliation by the West at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

For a while after her defeat in 1945, Japan shared with pre–Communist China the fate of 'the yellow man victimized', instead of 'the yellow man triumphant'. During World War II itself, and in the years immediately before the war, Japan's positive image among Asians and Africans had been tarnished seriously, not because of Japanese militarism, but because of Japanese imperialism, which, like other imperialisms, often took nonmilitary forms. Indeed, it is arguable that, although after the agony of Hiroshima, Japan has shed off its militarism, it has not relinquished its imperialism, having only replaced the imperial samurai by the businessman, the battalions with the multinational corporations, and the honour–motivated hara–kiri by profit–motivated business. Nevertheless, with Hiroshima, the image of Japan was partially transformed from one of original aggressor to that of ultimate victim. It shared once again the destiny of large numbers of nonwhite societies which had historically been used as raw material for economic and military experimentation.

Exactly forty years after the ecstacy of Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, came the agony of Hiroshima. And almost exactly twenty years after Hiroshima, China exploded its first nuclear bomb. All the three events were pregnant with symbolic meaning for Asians and Africans everywhere.

India: toward nuclearizing nonalignment

'Why is the Third World called "the Third World"? Because it exploded its nuclear device third!'

This African joke was heard in a café in Nairobi against the background of India's successful nuclear explosion in 1974. China's ambiguous status

between the Second World (of socialist development) and the Third World (of technological underdevelopment) gave India's own achievement an added significance. India, after all, was less ambiguously part of the Third World than the People's Republic of China could claim to be.

In 1923, writing on his deathbed, Lenin had linked three countries together and assessed their impact in terms of population (Snow, 1962a):

> In the last analysis the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc. account for the overwhelming population of the globe. And it is precisely that majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity.

Lenin saw in this fact an assurance for the complete victory of socialism. For a while, in the 1950s, it did seem that the three most populous countries in the world intended to remain on sufficiently friendly terms to exert a shared influence on the rest of the world. But, then, alternative possibilities began to be discernible. If China and Russia remained together, communism would retain a powerful backing. If India and China remained together, something approaching 'Pan–Asianism' could provide collective leadership to the colored nations of Asia and Africa at large and exercise considerable influence on diplomatic events in the world. For a while, it was India rather than China which was the effective leader of the new states. One factor which helped India to retain this leadership for a decade was the general diplomatic isolation of Communist China, including her exclusion from the United Nations.

India, in this period, bequeathed to the new states the doctrine of non–alignment. Milton Obote of Uganda, in his tribute to Nehru on the latter's death, said, 'Nehru will be remembered as a founder of non-alignment.... The new nations of the world owe him a debt of gratitude in this respect[1].' But nonalignment in the old sense had already been rendered impossible by Communist China. The two biggest members of the old community of Afro–Asian states each played a crucial role in the history of nonalignment– one of them, India, virtually invented it; the other, China, nearly destroyed it when she humiliated India militarily in 1962.

But, contrary to what many commentators in the West concluded, it was not the Chinese invasion of India that killed nonalignment; it only imperilled India's nonalignment. Even if that invasion had eliminated nonalignment from the rest of Asia as well, it could conceivably still have found in Africa and the Middle East the last and defiantly enduring bastions[2]. What ended nonalignment of the old style was China's dispute with the Soviet Union. The old nonalignment of Nehru had assumed a bipolarized cold war; its

[1] *Uganda Argus*, Kampala, 29 May, 1964.
[2] This point is discussed more fully in Mazrui (1967).

whole conceptual framework postulated a dichotomy between 'East and West'–and sometimes between 'communism and capitalism'. China's dispute with Russia suddenly rendered such dichotomies a little too simple. Reluctantly, but with increasing tempo, nonaligned states found themselves having to cope, not only with archaic contests between Russians and Westerners, but also with competition and hostility between the Russians and the Chinese.

India and the NPT. In the nuclear field, the Soviet Union first broke the initial atomic monopoly of the First World. By 1953, the United States started worrying about the consequences of proliferation. In a speech in the General Assembly that year, President Eisenhower made a new bid to get international cooperation in the utilization of atomic energy under specific safeguards. Out of this new American policy was born the proposal to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) linked to the United Nations. There followed in 1955 the first United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva, where significant exchange of 'de-classified' nuclear information raised hopes of increasing international collaboration in this field. The second Geneva conference was held in 1958 and the third in September 1964. The initial hopes of greater openness in the exchange of nuclear data, leading to the kind of international trust that might make military self-denial possible, proved only modestly justified. At last a treaty against tests in the atmosphere was forged. But the Geneva conferences and the test-ban treaty suffered alike from the fact that China was kept out of them.

In the meantime, there had been serious dissensions in the International Atomic Energy Agency, countries such as India insisting on having a say. A major bone of contention was the system of safeguards (applicable to fissionable material and equipment supplied by the Agency for use in certain nuclear reactors) adopted by the Agency at its 1960 general conference in the face of bitter and protracted protests from the Soviet Union and a number of neutralist countries led by India. The safeguards were regarded as discriminatory, disproportionate to the amount of support rendered by the Agency, and likely to reduce the pace of peaceful nuclear development in underdeveloped countries. The Western argument in support of the safeguards was that they 'would help prevent the proliferation of countries manufacturing nuclear weapons and would be a useful first step toward an arms control agreement[3].

By 1963, the Soviet Union showed signs of veering round to the Western position in this matter. At any rate, it accepted the system of safeguards for

[3]For a review of the arguments, see Rubinstein (1965).

the first time and supported the extension of safeguards to large-scale reactors of over 100 thermal megawatts (Rubenstein, 1965). The bilateral agreements announced to the General Assembly by US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on 5 November, 1954, failed to reassure the less developed countries about equality of treatment. Discrimination was all too evident in the fact that international safeguards were not applicable to the European atomic energy institutions. At a meeting of the Administrative and Legal Committee of IAEA on 27 September, 1963, Dr. Homi Bhabha, the Indian representative and head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, articulated a view that was widely shared by the nonwhite powers. He urged that Euratom be recognized and safeguards made applicable to it. It may be recalled that power stations operating under the auspices of Euratom were not subject to inspection by the Agency; Euratom had its own system of inspection under which one country could inspect the installation of other countries. Dr. Bhabha characterized this as 'a multinational and not an international arrangement'. He contended that only a truly international safeguards system could be effective[4]. In her bilateral agreements with Euratom, the United States had treated that body on a basis that could be described as 'cooperation between equals', unlike the scheme it devised for dealing with other countries. Defending the US position, John A. Hall, Assistant General Manager for the International Activities, US Atomic Energy Commission, and formerly Deputy Director General of IAEA, asserted that 'Euratom is unique' (Hall, 1965). That this did not carry conviction became particularly clear when, following China's testing of her first nuclear bomb in 1964 (within a year of the Soviet acceptance of IAEA safeguards), *Peking Review* asserted that China's intention in testing her first nuclear bomb in 1964 had been 'to break the nuclear monopoly'[5]. The collapse of any genuine international safeguards made India reexamine her security problems.

The quest for nonproliferation was certainly posing new problems for the viability of even the new polycentric version of nonalignment. If a non-proliferation treaty was to materialize, there was need for adequate guarantees to the non-nuclear powers on their security. But guarantees given to India by Western powers against nuclear China would amount to a nuclear alignment with the West. The way out seemed to be nuclear guarantees to India given by both the Western powers and the Soviet Union. This would be a whole new version of positive neutralism. For Nehru, nonalignment signified an alliance with neither bloc. But for his successor facing the current dilemma, positive neutralism was to mean alliance with both blocs.

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[4]Cited by Rubinstein (1965). See *Survival*, May-June 1965.
[5]*Peking Review*, 5 February, 1965.

Over the years, many in India had anyway become less purist in their nonalignment. Indian intellectuals, though supporting nonalignment in principle, nonetheless now desired to see the formulation of 'specific understandings' with the United Kingdom and the United States as an extra safeguard for the nation's security[6]. But nothing compelled Indians to reappraise more fully their place in the nuclear age than China's nuclear test. By the election campaign of 1966–1967, India's nuclear policy had become a significant political issue at home. The party which most vociferously championed the nuclearization of India was Jan Sangh, a movement of right-wing militancy. But the cause of making India nuclear power had other champions well to the left of Jan Sangh[7]. And many extra converts were made when China exploded a hydrogen bomb within months of the Indian election. Almost ten years later, the mission was completed. India's nonalignment was at last nuclearized.

For both China and India, atomic devices were a reaffirmation that the nuclear age had arrived on the Asian continent. The two giants of the Third World thus entered a new phase in their historic competition.

The population explosion and the nuclear mushroom. What is involved in the rivalry between India and China and in their shared attempts to catch up with the northern hemisphere are three forms of power: production, destruction, and procreation.

While, for the time being, the northern hemisphere (both East and West) has preeminence in the power of technological production and the power of military destruction, the Third World–and especially India and China–are numerically at the heart of the population explosion on the planet. Even a moderate increase of population in China or India has greater implications for the world as a whole than an accelerated population increase in a country like, say, Canada. For the time being, the power, and the will, to procreate is tilted in favour of the southern hemisphere.

It is inequalities in other arenas between the North and the South that has given the South's numerical superiority extra significance in the politics of global distribution. The Third World has at times tended to argue: 'We may be unequal to you in technology and education, in physical power and diplomatic sophistication, but, when all is said and done, there are more of us than you!'

Every advance in the North's nuclear capability raises the issue of how many people can be killed and with what speed. Every debate on the popula-

[6]See *Background*, Volume 9, Number 2, August 1965, Pundits and Panchsheela: Indian Intellectuals and Their Foreign Policy.

[7]For a discussion of aspects of India's defense policy, see A.D. Guha (1965), N.D. Palmer (1966), S.K. Gupta (1965), and Rajan (1965). See, also, *The Times* (London), 23 and 24 February, 1967.

tion explosion raises the issue of how many children may be born and at what intervals. The North's power of destruction is concerned ultimately with a census of corpses. The South's power of procreation is concerned with a census of new mouths to feed. Even the neutron bomb is partly concerned with comparative '*Mortemathics*'. Should new nuclear weapons kill more or fewer people? Is it immoral to kill people standing outside the mortuary–and leave the mortuary itself intact? Would it be less immoral if, in killing the living outside, the House of the Dead was also destroyed? The neutron bomb has helped to bring 'Mortemathical' equations to new levels of absurdity.

And yet, it remains true that the only measurable military factor in which India and China have superiority over either the United States or the Soviet Union is that of numbers. It seemed at first that the advent of nuclear weapons had made the population factor virtually irrelevant. If war was conventional, a numerical superiority of soldiers under arms would remain an asset, but in a conflict of massive nuclear destruction the size of a conventional army appeared to be of dubious significance.

But this whole line of reasoning is based on conventional assumptions of 'victory' and 'defeat' at the end of the war. In a nuclear war, numbers are indeed irrelevant in determining a conventional victory, but that is mainly because a full-scale nuclear holocaust cannot have an orthodox victory. As soon as one starts to assess the consequences of a nuclear war less in terms of victory than in terms of the balance of survival, population figures once again become admissible in the calculations. As Mao Tse-tung was once reported to have said to a visiting Yugoslav official in 1957:

> We aren't afraid of atomic bombs. We have a large territory and a big population. Bombs could not kill all of us. What if they killed over even 300,000,000? We would still have plenty more. China would be the last country to die[8].

It is not certain that Mao ever made such a statement. A specialist on Chinese studies at an American university suggested to this author in a conversation that the statement was probably propagated by the Russians for the specific purpose of gaining concessions from the West. But, as the late Edgar Snow put it, 'Even if Mao did not say that, someone would have had to invent it.' The statement was certainly consistent with Mao's general philosophy on the role of comparative population in warfare.

The People's Republic of China's policy on population control has itself not been consistent. The attraction of an ever expanding base of humanity has had to be balanced against the fate of policies intended to raise standards of general welfare. But there is no doubt that China is profoundly conscious

[8]Cited, among others, by Snow (1962b).

of the size of her population and regards it as one of her credentials for leadership in the world.

In any case, both India and China, as the two largest nations in the world, can perhaps afford to put the procreation brakes on. There is certainly more consistency in India with regard to the need for some family planning and birth control. Indira Gandhi's government went to the extent of promoting forced sterilization – though this contributed to her electoral downfall in March 1977.

However, the explicit and implicit rivalry between China and India is likely to continue in one form or another for some time to come. That rivalry may lead to new levels of awareness in each country of the comparative size of the other. Greater self-consciousness of comparative size may, in turn, affect population policies in the two countries in the years ahead. Nuclear competition may one day be linked to a demographic race. The power of destruction may thus find a point of fusion with the power of procreation.

What about the power of production? This comes out of a suitable relationship between energy, know-how and raw materials. The two Asian giants are augmenting their know-how. They are still weak in exploiting their raw materials. But they are learning to prospect for energy.

By a strange coincidence, both seem also to be on the verge of becoming major oil producers, and might well become significant oil exporters. Indeed, China's petroleum resources already allow for some exports, though partly because her own industrial capacity is still underdeveloped and she can therefore more easily spare some of her petroleum products. India's potential of offshore oil is only just beginning to reveal itself. What is already clear is that these two giants of the Afro-Asian world are augmenting their international leverage, given them by their size, with real power. The barrel of the gun was already part of the equation; the barrel of oil may one day complete it.

Arab world: discovery of oil power

Is the choice of leadership of developing countries limited to India and China? There was a time when this did indeed seem to be the case. When Nehru died in 1964, India was in diplomatic decline. One big question which arose was who was going to lead the Third World next. The People's Republic of China was already widely, though not unanimously, accepted as a partner in Third World struggles. For a while, it seemed almost logical that the mantle of Third World leadership should indeed pass from India to China. After all, size is a salient variable – and India and China were the largest countries on earth. What was more, both were committed to the anti-

imperialist struggle. The credentials of the Arabs for Third World Leadership still seemed modest by comparison with China's qualifications, or India's new potential. Until 1970, the Arabs did have Nasser, but he had been defeated even more decisively by Israel in 1967 than India by China in 1962.

Suddenly things began to change in 1973. If China thought that power resided in the barrel of gun, the Arabs discovered that power could also reside in the barrel of oil. The application of the Arab oil boycott against the United States in the course of the 1973 October war revealed new potentialities of political leverage of oil. This was the second of the two most important developments of the 1970s, the first being the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations in 1971. Both the events signified the erosion of Western domination of the world body and the emergence of developing countries as a truly decisive force in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The architects of the United Nations, meeting in San Francisco in 1945, thought of it as a body with a bicameral legislature after the pattern the history of Western political institutions had made them familiar with. The Upper House, named the Security Council, was to consist of five permanent members, and was supposed to be *the* decision-making body. The function of the Lower House, called the General Assembly, was to 'consult, advise and warn'. Each of the five permanent members (the elite of the Upper House) had the power to veto each other and the decisions of the entire Assembly on certain matters.

This five-member elite council of the peacemaking body was not chosen from among the most peaceloving countries in the world. It was, on the contrary, chosen on the basis of their military strength. This 'House of Lords' was thus in effect a council of *warlords*. There may have been good solid reasons why a peacemaking body should have at its appex a military aristocracy. It was arguable that peace could best be assured only by entrusting it to those with the greatest military capacity. For those who saw the United Nations as being primarily concerned with peace and stability–and less with human welfare and social justice–a bicameral legislature with an upper house controlled by the military giants was defensible.

In due course, the ultimate symbol of military capability came to be the testing and possessing of nuclear weapon. Here, again, the original choice of the elite within the Security Council was vindicated. The first five countries to become 'nuclear powers' were precisely the five original permanent members of the Council: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. For a while, the seat of China, the most populous member of the world body, was occupied by Taiwan, claiming to speak as a warlord when in fact it was a puppet of the United States.

By the end of the 1960s, the balance of influence, as between the Security

Council and the General Assembly, was observed to be changing. This too was in keeping with the history of bicameral legislatures within the Western world, as was the original institutional structure of the world body. The tendency in Western nations had been for the Upper House to become progressively less powerful than it was at the time of inception – best typified by Britain. A major reason of the accretion of influence and power to the House of Commons at the expense of the House of Lords was the expansion of the franchise. As the vote went to sectors of British society previously neglected, the House of Commons became both an outcome and an instrument of further democratization.

The history of the United Nations provides a striking parallel to this. The global equivalent of the extension of franchise has been the process of decolonization in Asia and Africa and the extension of the right of participation to Asian and African countries previously excluded from the mainstream of world politics. By the 1970s, the franchise was extended to the People's Republic of China (the world's most populous country) and to much smaller countries. Their votes helped to increase the influence of those that were previously disfranchised.

When, in 1973, OPEC quadrupled the price of oil and the Arabs used for a while an oil embargo in defence of their interests, an additional factor made its appearance in the United Nations. The smaller countries suddenly realized that from among their own ranks a new source of power was visible at the center of the world stage. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela, which had previously been regarded as no more than primary producers, were now exercising a new lever of influence on world events. This discovery of oil power both enhanced the self-confidence of all developing countries and increased the influence of the Arabs in the politics of the Third World.

Within the United Nations, Arab leadership was exercised in two major directions – the situation in the Middle East, and the quest for a new international economic order.

The thrust on the issue of the Middle East was two-pronged: one was directed at increasing the diplomatic and political legitimacy of the Palestinian cause under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the other at isolating Israel. The legitimation of the Palestine Liberation Organization was consummated when the leader of the organization, Yasir Arafat, was not only invited to address the General Assembly but was given the treatment of a head of state. Arafat's triumphant appearance at the General Assembly in 1974 and the participation of his organization in the Security Council debate on the Middle East in January 1976 were important milestones in the long struggle of the Palestinians. The admission of the PLO in some of the United Nations specialized agencies was also an

important aspect of this process of legitimation.

The strategy of isolating Israel attained its most dramatic moment with the vote on the resolution in 1975 which described Zionism as a form of racism. It was in fact a compromise resolution put forward in view of the failure of the more militant Arab states to muster enough support from the Third World either to expel Israel (which would in any case have needed the approval of the Security Council) or to suspend Israel from the General Assembly, like South Africa in 1974. Although the votes cast in favour were fewer than on most other issues on which the Arabs in the United Nations have sought to exercise leadership, they were much more than would have been thought possible a year earlier. Daniel P. Moynihan, the controversial ambassador of the United States in the United Nations at the time, claimed credit for the reduced vote. Whatever the truth of such claims, the denunciation of Israel's link with Zionism was the most spectacular of the measures designed to put Israel on the defensive and to isolate her diplomatically.

Oil power and the new international economic order. Apart from this, the Arabs have also exercised their influence in support of the move to help create a new international economic order. In this they have transcended their national or regional interests and have attempted to serve the Third World as a whole. Especially important in this movement in the initial phases was Algeria, whose president initiated the special General Assembly debate on raw materials and helped to chart a new direction for the world body in economic matters.

The debate in the Assembly in 1974 was passionate and sometimes acrimonious; it showed a basic confrontation between the developing countries and the industrialized states led by the United States. In the second General Assembly session on raw materials in 1975, the United States moderated its stand as it recognized the depth of the Third World feelings on the subject. In between these two meetings, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted in December 1974 virtually legitimized nationalization by Third World states of important industries without compensation under certain circumstances.

Clearly, no single country, like India or China, or group of states, like the Arab world, could capture the leadership of the Third World without successfully courting the African states. The numerical strength of the African vote in the General Assembly and in other international organizations is perhaps the only clear diplomatic advantage of Africa's fragmentation into a number of small countries. This multiplicity is a source of influence, and has contributed to the democratization of the world body.

Oil power and the resurrection of Islam

Linked to this new importance of the barrel of oil are the fortunes of the Crescent of Islam. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is overwhelmingly a Muslim institution. Saudi Arabia, the largest oil-exporting country, is the custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and one of the most fundamentalist of the Muslim countries. The second largest, Iran, another major Muslim country, is poised for expanding its influence in world politics. Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country since the dismemberment of old Pakistan, is also part of the OPEC. The small Gulf States, all Muslim, with their enormous financial resources, have surpluses which can be mobilized for political and economic projects in different parts of the world. Of the two Black African members of OPEC at the moment, Nigeria and Gabon, Gabon is led by a convert to Islam (President Omar Bongo). In Nigeria, which best encompasses within itself the three parts of the soul of Africa—the indigenous, the Euro-Christian and the Islamic—the Islamic factor has been growing in national influence since independence. Thus, OPEC as a whole is virtually two-thirds 'Islamic' both in composition and in oil production. In the background of the importance of petroleum, the emergence of OPEC on the world scene may well signify the beginning of the political resurrection of Islam.

A related issue is the nature of the regimes now in power in these resource-rich Muslim countries. It just so happens that the country with the largest known reserves, Saudi Arabia, is also the most Islamic in tradition. And it also so happens that Iran still has a monarchical system in a conservative Irano-Islamic context. The rulers of the littoral states of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf are also traditionalist. There is a tendency to regard this as a cost in the cost-benefit equation. But it is possible to view it as a benefit in global terms. The influence within OPEC does not lie in westernized or relatively secular Muslim countries such as Algeria. It lies even more in countries where Islam has been less diluted by westernism.

In the Muslim world as a whole, however, there is currently at work a dialectic between underpopulated but very rich traditionalist countries, on one side, and the populous, more secular but less endowed countries, on the other. Such a dialectic could change the balance between the forces of secularism and the forces of traditionalism in the years ahead.

The Palestinian question has doubtless been a catalyst of radicalization. Saudi Arabia applying the oil weapon against the United States would have been inconceivable without an issue such as Palestine and Jerusalem. A traditionalist, very highly pro-Western country could not have invoked a political weapon except under the stress of war and of anxiety over Palestine.

It seems to me that there are positive elements in the problem of Palestine

from a Third World perspective. It has indeed helped to create greater internationalism among the Arabs. But the question is whether, if the Palestine problem were to be solved, the Arabs would become isolationist. Would they lose interest in what happens, for example, in Africa, Bangla Desh, Pakistan or Latin America? The self-isolation of the Arab world in the event of the Palestine question being solved is one scenario. Another scenario is the '*northernization*' of the Arab world; that is to say, the Arab world increasingly regarding itself as part of the northern developed hemisphere and not as part of the southern underdeveloped hemisphere of the world.

As for the future of the Muslim world, the apparent Arab rapproachement with Iran, if lasting, could be one of the most significant developments for the future of Islam in the remaining quarter of this century. The reconciliation between Bangla Desh and Pakistan could also be very significant, not only for the entire Indian subcontinent, but also for the future of the Third World as a whole. Then, there is Turkey, which seems to be reasserting itself after a period of almost total absorption in the Western world. This might mean a new form of Ottoman resurgence. If the partial retreat from NATO is not just tactical but a more fundamental process of the resurgence of Turkey in the direction of nonalignment, then it would herald its reintegration into the Third World and its revival as a significant factor for the Muslim world as a whole.

New possibilities may open for Africa's own resurrection. Africa's most natural allies consist of the Black Diaspora and the Arab world. The Arabs are within Africa. So is the bulk of Arab land. Black and African states share the Organization of African Unity. This organization and the Arab League have overlapping membership. There are possibilities of exploiting this relationship to the common advantage of both peoples.

The Arab oil-producers have already started the strategy of economic counterpenetration into the West. It ranges from buying real estate in England to controlling a bank in the United States, from acquiring a considerable share in the Benz complex in West Germary to the possibility of extending a loan to Italy. The whole strategy of recycling petrodollars is pregnant with the possibilities of economic counterpenetration into the West. The Arab oil-producers are already entering the business of commercial multinational. One important multinational in Africa is Lonrho. Kuwait has entered it vigorously. There is indeed a risk that the oil-producers might start playing a subimperial role in Africa.

But alongside that risk is an opportunity for a new Third World alliance to counterpenetrate the West. Once again economic power and cultural influence might be linked. As we have noted, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is heavily Muslim in composition.

The rise of OPEC in world affairs, however transient, may herald the political resurrection of Islam. Before the end of this century, African Muslims, who will probably outnumber the Arabs, will be making a strong bid for shared leadership of Islam. It would not be surprising if, within the next decade, black Muslims from Africa are seen establishing schools and hospitals in Harlem and preaching Islam to black Americans. The funding for this Islamic counterpenetration will probably come from the oil-producers of the Arab world. But, since African Islam is distinctive from Arab Islam and carries considerable indigenous culture within it, Islamic counterpenetration into the United States would also be, in part, a process of transmitting African indigenous perspectives as well. Islam, Africanity and Western civilization may thus find new areas of interaction.

Conclusion

What should constantly be borne in mind is that petropower is not merely a political, economic and cultural leverage. It can also provide the means with which to purchase a certain degree of military capability. Religion, geography and economics have been the major causes of the militarization of the Middle East through the centuries. The religious factor has manifested itself in a variety of military ways, ranging from pre-Christian conflicts to the creation of the State of Israel, from the Crusades to the recent Lebanese civil war. Geography has bestowed on the Middle East a rather central position in the world. In ancient times, it was the crossroads of the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. In modern times, the Suez Canal has enabled it to retain that position. What is more, as military bases were established by European imperial powers from Suez to Aden, the region has been helped to militarize further. But another, and no less important, cause of the militarization of the Middle East has been economic, which has throughout influenced the twin factors of religion and geography. But the region's economic importance has since shifted from mere location to oil supplies. The location of oil in the region has made the economic dimension enormously important.

It is now less important that the Middle East connects Africa, Asia and Europe than that it accommodates beneath it the largest known resources of petroleum in the world. In quite fundamental ways, the barrel of oil has overshadowed both the shrine and the trade-route as the ultimate symbol of global significance of the Middle East. The barrel of oil is militarizing the Middle East in two ways: one, by making it an area which the Western world would be prepared either to invade or defend if the supply of oil was

endangered; two, by providing the Arabs and the Iranians with the means to purchase a greater military capability. France is helping an Arab Consortium to establish a major arms-manufacturing industry in Egypt. And Sadat is still expecting the United States to make good Richard Nixon's promise to establish a nuclear reactor in Egypt for peaceful purposes. In an important sense, Egypt is one major point of convergence between the trend toward the militarization of oil and the struggle to pacify nuclear energy. The hazards of both processes have been dramatized in the explosive context of Middle East politics.

India, at first hit hard economically by the exercise of new oil power of OPEC, which resulted in the quadrupling of the cost of her energy needs, began her collaboration with Canada to tap nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but succumbed later to the temptation of tapping nuclear power for defense as well as for economic needs. She has since found that more promising as a source of energy than the nuclear capacity she was developing under Canada's tutelage was the potential domestic supplies of petroleum on her own soil and on her own shores. Her credentials for Third World leadership in the years ahead may thus rest on both petropower and nuclear status.

Ideologically, China's interpretation of power should have rested more on economics than on militarism. The economic determinist assumptions of Marxism are not easily compatible with the Maoist doctrine that 'power resides in the barrel of the gun'. Marxism, in its classical formulation, would have put the technology of production higher than the technology of destruction as an ultimate source of power. In view of the critical technological and economic importance of petroleum for modern industry, it would be closer to Marxian theory to argue that power resides in the barrel of oil rather than in the barrel of the gun. But whatever the theoretical inconsistencies between Maoism and classical Marxism, the realities of the last quarter of the twentieth century would justify looking at power in both military and economic terms. The barrel of the gun and the barrel of oil have, for the time being, both become major fountains of leverage and influence. But while those who control the barrel of the gun no longer find it easy to acquire a barrel of oil by sheer force, those who control the barrel of oil are busy acquiring gunpower. The People's Republic of China is sufficiently large and sufficiently well endowed to become a superpower in both military and economic terms.

What about the role of imperialism in the new balance of social forces in the world? There has certainly been a change from the old days of Pax Britannica. Whereas the old imperial motto was 'Disarm the natives and facilitate control', the new imperial cunning has translated it into 'Arm the natives and consolidate dependency'. While the British and the French once

regarded it as important to stop 'tribal warfare', they now regard it as profitable to modernize that same 'tribal warfare'–with lethal weapons. Indeed, the French have been particularly active in the arms trade, not even hesitating to enter into nuclear collaboration with the white regime of South Africa.

This provoked the nonaligned states to contemplate the use of petropower against France in retaliation. Their Colombo meeting in August 1976 threatened an oil embargo if France did not change her policy regarding arms trade and nuclear technology for South Africa. And France announced new safeguards and precautions as a concession. But what has in reality protected France from petro–retaliation by the Third World is her own paradoxical foreign policy. While her policy toward Southern Africa has often been retrogressive, and sometimes cynical, her policy toward the Middle East has, on the whole, been progressive and relatively far–sighted. On important Middle Eastern issues, France has certainly been far ahead of most other Western countries. Charles de Gaulle was sympathetic to the Arabs at least a decade before the rise of OPEC or the assertion of Arab petropower; he transformed France's attitude to the Arabs well before the June war of 1967.

But now that the Arabs do have petropower–and petrodollars with which to buy gun–power–France has not been slow to capitalize on her preexistent cordiality with the Arabs. Competition among imperialist countries can at times indeed benefit the intended victims. The Arabs are benefiting from the scramble for their favors from countries which once ruled them.

The militarization of petropower continues at a greater pace than the struggle to pacify nuclear energy. Both processes are bound to condition the destiny of mankind as a whole in ways much more complex than we can as yet fully comprehend.

What is clear from this analysis is that there are compelling policy linkages which international actors have to take into account if progress is to be made towards a morally sustainable world order. These linkages are partly vertical, demanding that policy for one region or nation of the world be matched with comparable policy for other regions or nations. Thus, non–proliferation for the nuclear 'have–nots' will be a nonstarter until it is matched by progressive military denuclearization among the 'haves'. Arms control in the Third World will also be a nonstarter until there is more dramatic progress in arms control among the superpowers themselves. But there are also horizontal linkages between different sectors of policy–making. Thus, population control in the Third World has ultimately to be linked to issues of economic development and rising living standards. Progress towards reducing the incidence of regional wars may turn out to be inseparable from progress towards reducing poverty and inequality.

Vertical policy linkages imply the need for a global approach in each separate area of policy. Horizontal policy linkages imply an integrated systemic approach towards the different areas of policy together. Vertical linkages establish connections between the arms race of the Northern superpowers and the arms race in the Third World. Horizontal linkages establish connections between the arms race, on the one side, and problems of competitive imperialism and general underdevelopment, on the other. Vertical policy linkages cry out for the principle of globalism in purposeful social reform. Horizontal linkages cry out for creative systemic integration in policy-making.

For the time being, it is easier to make progress in globalizing policy on each separate issue than in integrating policies on a number of different issues.

As we have noted earlier, India grasped quite early the link between nuclear safeguards imposed upon the Third World and the continuation of nuclear hegemony by the Northern nuclear powers. This was an important aspect of India's nuclear logic from the days of Prime Minister Nehru. When US President Jimmy Carter visited India in January 1978, the country's policy under Premier Morarji Desai had not changed fundamentally on that issue.

Carter was followed by the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, who carried the discussion further with Morarji Desai. But the Indian leader continued to insist upon the relevance of vertical linkages, to use our terminology. Talking to British journalists on 8 January, 1978, Morarji Desai referred to the fact that he had by then met not only Premier Callaghan and President Carter but also President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union. Desai made it clear that he wanted the weapon-possessing states to make determined efforts to agree on the progressive reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. He reiterated that India would be prepared to open its nuclear installations to international safeguards only when the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union signed a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. When pressed by journalists to say whether China – which was India's most immediate concern – would accept an international ban on all nuclear explosions, Desai indicated his belief in the momentum of a genuinely global policy-making. He insisted: 'China will also come round when the world comes round'[9]. Desai also saw France falling in line if the superpowers themselves showed genuine nuclear self-denial.

Desai's optimism may have been excessive as regards the speed of general denuclearization. But he and the preceding prime ministers of India have grasped the relevance of global vertical linkages in the nuclear field and have

[9]See *The Times*, London, 10 January, 1978.

attempted to relate this principle to their concrete policies.

And yet, at least for the time being, India has not gone far enough in linking nuclear proliferation to the arms race among the big powers themselves. A test ban treaty by Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in 1979 is not likely by itself to stem proliferation elsewhere. It may persuade India to accept safeguards, but will not persuade Israel (or Iran or Argentina) to deny itself nuclear status.

Only *further* proliferation could create among the nuclear-haves (including India and China) a sufficiently great sense of imminent peril to tilt their own judgement in the direction of favoring total denuclearization in the military field everywhere. But how many additional nuclear powers does the world need before a climate of 'clear and present danger' is created? It may be a dozen; it may be more; it may be less. A prior initiative by the nuclear-haves to start the process of military denuclearization may help to dissuade at least some of the have-nots from seeking nuclear status.

As for horizontal linkages between military, economic and demographic areas of policy-making, these may prove more difficult to operationalize. The Third World has been seeking to link questions of energy supplies in the world with questions of trade, development and global fiscal policies. Henry Kissinger, when in office, resisted this, insisting that the dialogue between oil producers and oil consumers should be separate from the discussions of such issues as commodity stabilization and a moratorium on debts in the Third World as a whole. In the end, the United States agreed to a North-South dialogue on all these issues, but within four separate commissions; energy, trade, development and monetary issues were handled separately in spite of the formally shared umbrella of the Paris dialogue. This dialogue has failed for the time being.

What this means is that even within the economic sector (trade, aid, energy, and monetary policies) the pursuit of an integrated systemic approach based on horizontal linkages is resisted by those who have already 'arrived'. Such an integrated approach becomes exponentially more difficult when it seeks to interrelate policies among such seemingly disparate sectors as economic arrangements, military planning and population policies.

But the have-nots in the world must continue to press both for vertical globalization of social reform and for horizontal integration of policy-making. India may have recaptured the leadership in the struggle to create nuclear equity in the world as we have it. China has combined numerical preeminence as the most populous nation in the world with a new aspiration to excel in both productive power and destructive capacity in the post-Mao era. The Arabs have retained leadership in the struggle for a new international economic order.

For the time being, it may be difficult to involve China decisively enough

in Third World consultations about global reform. The People's Republic is at the moment excessively obsessed with its anti-Soviet campaigns. But as the first clear-cut Third World nuclear power, India, on the one side, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, on the other, should enter into discussions with each other on issues of nuclear energy to issues of oil supplies. Third World nuclear powers have to initiate systematic consultations with Third World oil producers. The dialogue should include prospects for the pacification of nuclear energy on a world scale, as well as the linkages between the different forms of energy. Brazil may also have to be brought in at some stage.

Such a dialogue could in time lead to greater coordination of policies among Third World countries, enhancing their leverage in the pursuit of an integrated world reform.

What is becoming increasingly clear is not merely interdependence among nations, but also interconnections among different sectors of policy. We have sought to demonstrate that the pursuit of disarmament or even arms control cannot be separated from the struggle for equity in world politics. If the barrel of oil is contributing towards a new international order, some degree of nuclear proliferation may also be inescapable as a price for the same ideal. A New International Military Order thus becomes one precondition for a New International Economic Order. China's experimental rockets, India's nuclear devices, and the new arms industry which the French are planning to construct for an Arab consortium, may have to be placed alongside OPEC as part of the total leverage which the Third World has to exert if the global system as a whole is to change towards greater equity—before it collapses under the burden of its own insidious contradictions.

Nuclear capacity, as we have already noted, is also linked with the Third World's quest of dignity and power. An increasing number of countries nourish the ambition of becoming members of the nuclear club. But exclusive clubs are a matter of elite status, rather than of human dignity. Man's dignity today is not a matter of membership of the nuclear club, but a matter of membership of the nuclear age. Membership of the nuclear club means possession of nuclear weapons; membership of the nuclear age means participation in the science of the age. As former President Kwame Nkrumah put it once, neither Ghana nor Africa could afford to lag behind other nations in this 'age of atomic revolution'. Speaking at the foundation-laying ceremony of Ghana's Atomic Reactor Center at Kwambenya, near Accra, Nkrumah declared[10]:

> We must ourselves take part in the pursuit of scientific and technological research as a means of providing the basis for our socialist society. Socialism without science is void.... We have

[10]See *Ghana Today*, Volume 8, Number 21, 16 December 1964.

therefore been compelled to enter the field of atomic energy because this already promises to yield the greatest economic source of power since the beginning of man.

But participation in the science of the atomic age postulates some kind of participation in nuclear science itself. Not every new country can as yet afford a reactor, and many are prepared to wait until they can justify the expense involved in acquiring one. But early participation in nuclear technology remains an attractive goal for reasons which are not unconnected with ideological egalitarianism.

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WORLD ORDER VALUES
Peace·Economic Well-Being·Social Justice·Ecological Balance

$1.50